Ekam issues the identity tokens your agents authenticate with. The key that signs
those tokens is the single most sensitive secret we hold, so we treat it accordingly.
Hardware-rooted key custody
- Hardware root of trust. The signing key is protected by a Thales HSM-sealed vault.
Trust flows from certified hardware, not from a config file.
- No plaintext key at rest. The key is stored only as ciphertext, wrapped by a
key-encryption key that never leaves the HSM-sealed vault. Our database, backups and disk
images contain nothing usable.
- In-memory only. At startup a workload decrypts the key into memory for the lifetime of
the process. It is never written back to disk in the clear.
- No static secrets. Workloads authenticate to the vault with short-lived,
cluster-issued identity, not a long-lived token that can leak and be replayed.
- Fail-closed. If the vault is unreachable, Ekam refuses to start rather than fall back
to a weaker key. There is no silent degradation and no backup plaintext copy to fall back to.
- Verifiable trust, offline. Every token is ES256-signed; relying parties verify
signatures offline against our public JWKS, with no callback to Ekam on the hot path.
What this means for you. Compromising our datastore yields no usable
signing key; there is no static credential to steal; and you can independently verify both the
custody posture and every token we issue.
Verify it yourself
- Live attestation.
GET /healthz reports keySource: "vault":
the running system confirms its key was unwrapped from the HSM-sealed vault, not loaded from a
static secret.
- Offline signature check. Fetch
/.well-known/jwks.json and verify any token
we issue against it, with no call back to us.
- Guided validation. On request we'll walk your security team through a live demonstration,
including that the service fails closed when vault access is removed, proving there is no
hidden plaintext key.
Compliance posture
This design keeps Ekam outside the PCI-DSS audit boundary while inheriting HSM-rooted trust,
mirroring the pattern used by our IAM and SSH key-management services. Personal data is stored and
processed on Krutrim Cloud, in India, with cross-region disaster recovery (see
DPDP and Privacy).
Scope, stated plainly. Signing is performed in application memory, not inside
the HSM. Full "the key never touches a host under any circumstance" assurance is covered by
third-party audit on our roadmap. We don't claim it here.